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Abstract 
While previous studies have focused on the relation between idiosyncratic risk 
and short interest in US stock markets, we test whether the Canadian market shows the 
same symptoms in costs limiting arbitrage. In order to measure arbitrage cost, we use 
idiosyncratic risk and use it as a proxy to determine the cost level. To prevent any 
ambiguity and bias in our result, we use commonly recognized indexes to measure both 
transaction and holding costs. Consistent with the similar study conducted in U.S., we 
find that high Short Interest Canadian stocks appear to have higher idiosyncratic risk 
that is significant enough to affect investors’ decisions. 
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Introduction 
 In the past few decades, tremendous amount of studies has been conducted to 
explain the relationship between short interests and stock returns in U.S. stock market. 
Famous articles as Dechow, Hutton, Meullbroek, and Sloan (2001), Desai, Ramesh, 
Thiagarajan and Balachandran (2002), Asquith and Meullbroek (1995) have all shown 
that stocks that are highly shorted tend to have relatively low returns in the period after. 
Although it makes sense intuitively, the fact that stock prices move away from 
fundamental value is not consistent with the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Theory 
introduced by Treynor (1961, 1962), William Sharpe (1964). In the paper by Gang, 
Ying and McLean (2009), two important problems have been identified to further 
analyze the anomaly, they are: (1) the cause of this anomaly (2) the barrier that prevents 
investors to arbitrage away the mispricing.  
Much effort has been spend on the first idea.  Supported by papers from Boehme, 
Danielsen, Kumar; and Sorescu (2008); Diether Malloy, and Scherbina (2002); Asquith, 
Pathak, and Ritter (2005), Miller (1977) used unexplained volume to capture 
information on investors’ private valuation, and thus have come to the conclusion that 
the abnormal high stock price is the product of investors opinion divergence and short 
sale cost. Alternatively saying, unexplained volume and short sales cost would together 
create an upward price bias.  
There has been a great controversy in the explanation of the second problem. 
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The problem arises as: Since people are willing to put effort to identify any mispriced 
stocks, why don’t they completely hedge/arbitrage this security and make profit? While 
many people believe that high lending fee is the major barrier that prevents investor 
from doing so, papers from Danilsen, Boehme, Sorescu (2006), DAvolio (2002) 
analyzed the market for borrowing and lending securities, and concluded that the loan 
fees for highly shorted stocks are less than the stock market average and shouldn’t be 
considered as a main factor. Based on this idea, Gang, Ying and McLean (2009) tested 
the effect of idiosyncratic risk on arbitrage activities, and ultimately come to the 
conclusion that idiosyncratic risk is the main reason that prevents rational investor to 
arbitrage the mispricing. Our paper contributes the literature by extending the evidence 
to Canada 
While studies has focused on explaining anomaly and problems for the U.S. 
security market, it has come to our attention that there is no similar study conducted in 
Canadian security market. In order to fully test the theory above, we perform our 
regression analysis on large cap Canadian stocks from 2002 to 2011. To have a 
conservative measure, we decided to use idiosyncratic risk as the primary proxy to 
estimate the holding cost. The reason behind is that Pontiff (2006) recognized the 
idiosyncratic risk as the primary holding cost. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also pointed 
out that the larger the weight of a single security, the higher the risk for the entire 
portfolio. This concept is similar to that in Arrow (1965), which implied a risk averse 
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investor will take a larger position in a low idiosyncratic risk security. Based on the 
above, both Pontiff (2006) and Treynor (1973) agreed that a high short interest and 
idiosyncratic risk stock would have a larger alpha among other stocks. In this case, we 
believe idiosyncratic risk is a fair measure compares to other methods. 
According to our result, we find that idiosyncratic risk is positively correlated 
with short interest for Canadian large cap stocks, and the difference between high and 
low idiosyncratic risk is as much as 0.391% per month. We also find that there is a 
positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and the size of the company. We show 
that  in  Canadian  stock  market,  the  short  seller’s  alpha  is  positively  correlated  with 
idiosyncratic risk, which corresponds to the result acquired in Gang, Ying and McLean 
(2009). 
The structure of the paper is as follow. Part II of the paper discussed why we 
recognize idiosyncratic risk as an arbitrage cost. Part III shows the data we used to 
conduct our test and gives an explanation of our result. Part IV contains the conclusion. 
 
 
A rbitrage costs 
a. Definition of arbitrage 
Arbitrage is the transaction where a rational agent tries to profit from mispricing 
and  idiosyncratic  risk  is a  typically arbitrage cost. Since arbitrageur couldn’t diversify 
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way the idiosyncratic risk, it will affect arbitrage activity. As Pontiff (1996) states, each 
arbitrage cost can be categorized as either a holding cost or a transaction cost, which can 
prevent rational traders from eliminating mispricing completely. 
 
b. Holding cost  
Holding costs occur in every period that a position is kept open. They include 
opportunity cost of capital, the opportunity cost of not receiving full interest on short-
sale proceeds, and idiosyncratic risk exposure.  
Tuckman and Vila (1992) point out that holding and transaction costs make 
riskless arbitrage risky. For example, in an efficient market Stock A has intrinsic value 
of $ 100. Without holding and transaction costs, the investor will short Stock A and wait 
until for the price drops to the fair value to cover his/her position if the price of A is 
over $100. 
In practice, holding and transaction cost exit. Assume that holding cost for Stock A in 
each period is $10. If the mispricing dissipates within multiple periods, the arbitrageur 
can gain profit. Or else he or she will lose. On the other hand, assume that transaction 
cost for shorting Stock A is $1 for one time and the arbitrageur enters the short position 
at $10. Therefore the arbitrageur can gain profit only if the price below $9 after that 
period ends. Or else he or she will lose. 
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                      Price 
                                                                        All noise trader price path 
 
                  Fair value 
 
                                                                                                                                          Time 
Fig. 1.  Hypothetical mispricing process without holding and transaction costs 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the intrinsic value of a stock and 
mispricing overtime. The wave-like line stands for the mispricing when the investors 
are irrational. Without the costs (holding and transaction costs), the rational trader in 
market will push the wave-like line into a straight, horizontal line, which represents the 
intrinsic value of the stock. The price wave represents the all noise trader equilibrium. 
                            Price 
All noise trader price path 
 
                    Fair value 
                                    
Equilibrium price path 
                                                                                                                                                  Time 
Fig. 2. Hypothetical mispricing process when holding costs exit 
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Fig. 2 considers equilibrium with holding cost. Investors will take the arbitrage 
position when price derives from fair value. When holding costs exit, arbitrageurs will 
never enter the position until the profit still keep positive when it’s minus by the holding 
costs. 
 
c. Transaction cost 
Transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange Commissions and 
brokerage fees are examples of transaction costs. 
                        Price 
                               x 
                 Fair value                                        B 
                              -x            A 
                                                                                                                 Time 
Fig. 3.  Hypothetical mispricing process when transaction costs exit. 
 
Figure 3 showed the situation with only exit transaction cost. Both x and –x stand 
for transaction boundary. The area between the boundaries will make any arbitrage 
unprofitable (As if point B), whereas the area outside the boundary will make arbitrage 
profitable (As if point A).  
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d. Summary: 
Mispricing has the same relationship with holding costs and transaction costs: the 
greater the cost, the greater the potential mispricing. Those costs decrease the possibility 
of rational traders to trade against the mispricing. 
 
 
How does idiosyncratic r isk Make A rbitrage Costly? 
a. In practice, idiosyncratic risk cannot be fully diversified away. 
Idiosyncratic risk is also called unsystematic risk. It is the risk of price change 
due to the unique circumstances of a specific security, as opposed to the overall market. 
In paper Jonasson and Karakitsios (2006), financial theory and standard asset-
pricing models illustrate that idiosyncratic diversifying the portfolios can eliminate 
future risk. Although former studies state that a portfolio is well diversified only if it is 
containing approximately 20 to 30 stocks, Malkiel & Xu (2004) challenge that this is 
only true if the stocks are picked out randomly.  
Investors may fail to diversify their portfolios in a way that completely eliminates 
idiosyncratic risk. This may be due to for instance capital constraints, transaction costs 
and liquidity needs. Reasons for large holdings of individual stocks may also be due to 
controlling incentives and restrictions set by corporate compensation policies. Investors 
with under-diversified portfolios are not only affected by shifts in the market volatility, 
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but also from shifts in idiosyncratic volatility (Campbell et al. 2001). 
 
b. The role of idiosyncratic risk 
Revisit portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) can explicitly consider the impact of 
idiosyncratic risk. Assume an investor can buy and sell any risk-free security, market 
and mispriced security. And we assume this investor is a price taker as did in Petajisto 
(2004) and Fama and French (2005).  
A rational investor will regroup the hedged portfolio by selecting the appropriate 
mispriced securities, then holds it and short the same number of share to the market. In 
the case that covariance is only determined by market factor, each of the hedge 
portfolios will only exposed to idiosyncratic risk. This framework ruled out any other 
relevant factors other than mispricing. Thus, the stock alpha only come from the hedged 
position. 
Hedged position return can be written as ri, where: ri = αi   + rf   + ei                                                 (1) 
In the case that no market risk exists and all securities are correctly priced, the return 
will be the same as risk-free rate rf . However, if mispricing exists, the alpha will be 
represented by αi . Unexpected noise will be represented by ei. Once the position is fully 
hedged, the risk and noise will be uncorrelated, total risk of the portfolio will be written 
as: 
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σp2  = σm2  xm2  + ∑ σi2 xi2ni=1                                         (2) 
In the equation above, xi is the weight of security I, σi is the idiosyncratic risk and σm  
stands for volatility (of market return).  
If we extend the topic with mean-variance investor in the market, we use risk aversion 
parameter  and take it to the following equation: 
U=xf rf  + xm  E( rm  ) + ∑ (αi   +  rf) xini=1  - λ2 σp2  
Where the optimal portfolio weights are calculated by setting the first-order condition to 
zero, and all weights sum to 1. 
 
c. idiosyncratic risk deters arbitrage 
Some studies point out that idiosyncratic risk deters arbitrage. Pontiff (1996 and 
2006) argues that idiosyncratic risk is a significant cost to the arbitrageur because it is 
the single largest impediment to market efficiency. He also proposes a framework in 
which idiosyncratic risk is important, regardless of whether arbitrageurs have access to 
many or few arbitrage opportunities.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) illustrate that arbitrage risk is important to the 
existence of mispricing. Arbitrageurs research each stock they invest in carefully, and 
then select some of them in their arbitrage portfolios. Arbitrageurs can eliminate the 
systematic risk by hedging, or taking the systematic risk can compensate them. 
However, hedging if they fail to diversify their portfolios cannot eliminate the 
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idiosyncratic risk. So that idiosyncratic risk is added to the total portfolio risk without a 
corresponding increase in expected returns. Therefore, risk-averse arbitrageurs pay lots 
of attention to idiosyncratic risk. 
Treynor and Black (1973) who focus on active portfolio management theory 
shows that in a mean-variance framework that the portfolio weights chosen by an 
informed  arbitrageur  are  negatively  related  to  a  security’s  idiosyncratic  risk  and 
positively related to a security’s alpha. Pontiff (2006) further contends that this implies 
an arbitrageur’s weight  in a given mispriced security  is  independent of  the number of 
other mispriced  securities  in  the  portfolio.  Therefore,  the  security’s  idiosyncratic  risk 
will limit the position an arbitrageur takes in any individual security. 
On the other hand, Bennett and Sias (2008) conclude that it is essentially 
impossible to form the well-diversified portfolios. Risk-averse arbitrageurs would like 
to give more weights to stocks with lower expected idiosyncratic risk when they decide 
which mispriced stocks can be taken into the position. 
 
 
Idiosyncratic r isk affects investment decision 
Ross (2004) points out idiosyncratic risk affect investment through the way of 
affecting managerial risk attitude. In practice, companies have different compensation 
schedule for their employees, such as bonus, options and shares. Because of those 
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schemes, Decision makers who have different risk attitude would pay close attention to 
the idiosyncratic variability and would have different reactions. For example, when a 
project is with high idiosyncratic risk, risk aversion decision makers are unwilling to 
take it, because it leads to an increase in the variability of the firm's cash flows. 
Froot et al. (1993) show that though the decision makers are risk-neutral, convex 
costs of external finance may induce firms to behave in a risk-averse fashion. Decision 
makers will avoid excessive risk-taking because of this motive, even if that risk is 
idiosyncratic. Thus, the likelihood of financial constraints can be considered as 
increasing the effective risk aversion of the decision makers. 
However, it will raise another issue. If the decision makers use to value a project 
depends on its idiosyncratic risk, absent any other frictions, it will lead to inefficient 
investment decisions from the shareholders' perspective. A feasible way that 
shareholders can prevent this destruction in value is through increased monitoring. 
Furthermore, monitoring may be easier or more effective when institutions rather than 
households own the majority of the firm. The former have more expertise and since they 
typically hold larger shares, suffer less from the free-rider problem. Thus, we expect the 
effect to be stronger for firms with low levels of institutional ownership. Indeed, the 
level of insider ownership matters for the sensitivity of investment to idiosyncratic risk 
only when institutional ownership is low. 
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Data and brief Methodology 
a. Sample Source 
Our data sample includes monthly short positions for TSX 60 stocks during the 
period January 2002 through January 2011 (This is chosen because the short interest 
data is not completely available prior 2000). Since the number of shares shorted in each 
stock is collected by the Toronto exchange on 15th date each month, these data only 
reflects the completed trade before the reporting date, and incomplete trade data is not 
reported under Toronto Stock exchange policy. Unlike Gang, Ying and McLean (2009), 
we extract daily prices, volumes, and market to book ratios, value-weighted returns and 
monthly short interest directly from Bloomberg. However, similar information can also 
be accessed through Google Finance or other exchanges’ websites. At last, in order to 
prevent exchange effect, all the units have been converted into US dollar. 
Similar to that in Gang, Ying and McLean (2009), we assume that all the 
portfolio strategies we mentioned in this paper are applied after the month information 
has been released. For instance, if short interest for February is released then we 
measure the returns started from March. We believe it is rational to assume that most 
educated  investors  can  implement  their  strategy  according  to  previous  month’s 
information. 
 
b. Arbitrage Cost Estimates 
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Following Pontiff (1996) and Gang, Ying and McLean (2009), we divided our 
arbitrage estimates into holding cost and transaction cost. Transaction cost appears 
when a position is either open or closed, and holding cost only occurs in every period 
that position is kept open. 
 
b.1. Holding costs estimates 
Since we only want to test the hypothesis in Canadian Large Cap stocks, we 
followed Treynor and Black (1973), Pontiff (1996,2006), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and identify idiosyncratic risk as our holding cost. As conducted in Gang, Ying and 
McLean (2009), we calculate idiosyncratic risk by running a regression on the previous 
on hundred days’ returns of each stock on a daily basis of modified 4-factor model.  The 
four factors are: Size, market to book ratio, momentum and the difference between 
value-weighted market index and risk-free rate. To correctly measure the mispricing 
without any lags, only those stocks with more than twenty-five  days’  returns  are 
included in our sample. As for measuring the mispricing, we took the standard deviation 
of the residuals from those regressions and identify them as idiosyncratic risk.  
The reason for why we only use four-factor model instead of five or more is that 
adding more factors into the regression will not significantly change the residuals. 
Moreover, there are plenty of studies showed high correlation exists among different 
measures of idiosyncratic risk. Strong evidence can be draw from the paper of 
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Zhuravskaya and Wurgler (2002), in which it showed that multiple factor model has 
similar result as the four factor model. 
 
b.2. Transaction Costs Estimates 
In order to fit Canadian Stock Market, we used three proxies to form the 
transaction cost estimates, they are size, price and dollar trading volume.  
Size is included because Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), Gang, Ying and 
McLean (2009) used it to evaluate transaction cost. According to their research, small 
size stocks tend to be less liquid and have higher bid ask spreads. Dollar volume is 
included to measure the liquidity of the security. We calculate dollar volume by taking 
the volume traded each day for the previous month and take the average among them. 
For example, we suppose a stock with larger dollar volume will be more liquid than that 
with smaller dollar volume, and also the volume amount is negatively correlated with 
the change in price when traded. The above has been tested in Spiegel and Wang (2006), 
in which the dollar volume is identified to be the only significant measure for liquidity. 
Price is included to calculate the market value of the security, and this method has also 
be used by Ali, Hwang , and Trombley (2003).  
 
b.3. O ther Estimates 
Other estimates has been used to evaluate our short interest portfolios in cross 
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sectional testing, they are Size, Momentum and market to book ratio. We use size to 
setup a liquidity measure, and we use market to book value to detect whether a company 
is overvalued or undervalued. Momentum is calculated by using previous 180 days 
return with a 30 days gap. 
 
c. Short Interest Portfolio 
Our short interest portfolio is selected using two methods. The first method is to 
group securities under absolute benchmark, and the other method is to select securities 
under relative rank.  
In our first method, a benchmark is selected, since we modified our short interest 
estimate by dividing it by shares outstanding, we believe a short interest value that 
larger than 1 indicates a highly shorted stock. Following Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan 
and Balachandran (2002), we grouped the stocks with Short Interest larger than 1 into 
our high short interest portfolio, and those with short interest below one into our low 
short interest portfolio. 
The second method is similar to that in Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), we 
use percentile as a benchmark instead of a constant number. This allows us to identify 
high short interest stock for each month. For instance, for every monthly stock with 
short interest above 99th percentile, we group them into our high short interest portfolio, 
and for those with that below 99th percentile are grouped as low short interest portfolio. 
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d. Summary Stat 
Table 1 below showed our result for high and low short interest portfolios from 
period January 1st 2002 to July 1st 2007, this period is selected to separate the influence 
caused by financial crisis. Following Gang, Ying and McLean (2009) conducted for U.S. 
market, we calculate the median of each variable each month, and then take the average 
of each median. 
TA B L E 1 H igh Short Interest Portfolios (2002 to 2005) 
 
The first column in the table shows the time series average of each median short 
interest. For high short interest portfolios, the value is 6.736 to 0.782 considering the 
different method we use. As for the low short interest portfolio, the short interest ranged 
from 0.334 to 0.512. This result is similar to that formed in Pontiff (2006) and Gang, 
Ying and McLean (2009).  
TA B L E 2 Short Interest Comparison US vs. C A D  
  US market 
CAD 
market 
High SI portfolio 23.3~6.7 6.736~ 0.782 
  SI IR SIZE 
MKT/B
K VOLD MOM PRC 
High SI (95~99%tile) 4.948 1.983% 7830.51 2.20 3183829.31 1.97 18.69 
Low SI (<95%tile) 0.593 1.392% 3583.14 2.09 302949.92 10.62 17.57 
High SI (>=99%tile) 6.736 1.823% 6839.41 2.09 2940843.54 1.99 17.53 
Low SI (<99%tile) 0.512 1.314% 3984.86 2.05 320494.19 10.08 15.89 
High SI (0.5~1) 0.782 1.593% 7021.58 2.19 4530304.85 2.92 20.32 
Low SI (<0.5) 0.334 1.143% 9938.55 2.03 2104948.43 1.16 19.54 
High SI (>=1) 2.098 1.498% 6494.33 2.08 3104955.55 2.04 18.03 
Low SI (<1) 0.427 1.287% 3058.25 2.01 32049.96 4.38 16.24 
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Low SI portfolio 0.3~0.2 0.334~0.512 
 
 Compares to the same research conducted in US market, Table 2 showed the 
difference in high short interest portfolio between US and Canadian stocks. Compares 
to the high short interest portfolio in Canadian market, U.S. short interest portfolios tend 
to have more shares shorted. This appears to be rational because U.S. market is 
considered larger and more liquid than Canadian market. 
The second column in Table 1 reveals idiosyncratic risk for portfolios at 
different short interest level. It appears that higher short interest portfolios have higher 
idiosyncratic risk, and the difference is significant enough to affect investors’ decision. 
For instance, a high short interest portfolio at 95~99 percentile has Idiosyncratic risk 
1.983%, but for portfolio below 95 percentile the risk level dropped to 1.392%. Another 
thing worth mentioning is that highly shorted US market stocks tend to have higher 
idiosyncratic risk than that in Canadian market.  
TA B L E 3 Idiosyncratic r isk Comparison (US vs. C A D) 
  US market CAD market 
HighSI (95~99%tile) 3.2 2.0 
Low SI (<95%tile) 2.9 1.4 
High SI (>=99%tile) 2.9 1.8 
Low SI (<99%tile) 2.9 1.3 
 
Table 3 shows that to the data from Ying and McLean (2009), we find that 
highly shorted Canadian large cap stocks are on average 1.2% less risky than total 
  23 / 27 
 
US market stocks. This has two implications; first, large stocks tend to have low Sigma. 
Second, we have successfully excluded the short interest fluctuation caused by financial 
crisis and the market bubble. One more result showed in this comparison is that the 
effect of higher idiosyncratic risk tend to follow higher short interest exist among 
Canadian large cap stocks.  
The third column in Table 1 showed that highly shorted portfolios tend to be 
larger (in size) than less shorted portfolios. For instance, the size of 95~99 percentile 
stocks appears to be twice the size as those with below 95 percentiles. This ratio is 
similar to that in Gang, Ying and McLean (2009), Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) 
and Hutton, Sloan, Dechow and Meulbroek (2001), who also argue that short sellers 
favor large firms. One reason to explain this can be found in D’Avolio (2002), where he 
shows that it is relatively cheaper to borrow from large size company because of higher 
liquidity.  
The fourth column in Table 1 shows the Market to book ratio, and the result 
implies that highly shorted stocks tend to be growth stocks, this results follows the test 
done in Gang, Ying and McLean (2009) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) and 
Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001). Although the difference is not as 
significant present in U.S. market, we believe it is because our sample only consists of 
large cap stocks, which diluted the large capital gap. 
The fifth column revealed the average daily trading volume, and this is used as 
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an estimate for liquidity measure. The trading volume in the high short interest portfolio 
is several times larger than that in low short interest portfolio. This is similar to the 
result in Gang, Ying and McLean (2009).  
d.  F inancial Crisis 
The following table is constructed for period between July 1st 2007 and January 1st 
2011; which has covered the entire financial crisis period.  
TA B L E 4 H igh Short Interest Portfolios (2005 to 2011) 
  Compares to table 1, although higher risk follows higher short interest, both short 
interest and idiosyncratic risk rises, suggesting that during the crisis more shares are 
shorted and higher risk is embedded into the portfolio. This result corresponds to the 
fact that most of the stocks suffer from great volatility during the crisis, which implies 
that both short interest and idiosyncratic risk are higher than normal level under extreme 
market condition.  
 
 
e. Summary of the results 
  SI IR SIZE 
MKT/B
K VOLD MOM PRC 
High SI (95~99%tile) 7.837 4.673% 8384.42 2.54 3294845.24 2.34 14.76 
Low SI (<95%tile) 2.958 2.958% 4098.23 2.11 329484.03 11.65 12.53 
High SI (>=99%tile) 6.485 5.634% 7284.75 2.43 3919484.44 1.56 14.23 
Low SI (<99%tile) 2.494 2.114% 3749.51 2.13 384887.25 11.87 11.54 
High SI (0.5~1) 2.644 4.948% 7389.14 2.64 4693858.89 2.34 15.81 
Low SI (<0.5) 1.059 1.983% 9492.41 2.57 2231423.17 1.43 12.39 
High SI (>=1) 4.636 2.847% 7263.31 2.58 3929848.56 2.26 15.23 
Low SI (<1) 2.058 1.287% 3928.31 2.73 398483.32 4.66 12.75 
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Since higher idiosyncratic risk tends to correlate with higher short interest in 
Canadian large Cap Stocks, it is rational to believe that under normal and extreme 
market condition, holding a Canadian large cap stock that has higher short interest 
will increase the idiosyncratic risk more than holding low short interest stocks. This 
implies that while considering buying large cap stock for diversification or arbitrage 
in Canadian market, short interest is a significant factor to be considered before 
making any trade.  
 
Conclusion 
 Considering some papers have proved that highly shorted stocks tend to 
correspond to high idiosyncratic risk in U.S. stock market, we extend this hypothesis to 
Canadian large cap stocks and draw similar conclusion. Our results are consistent with 
observations in other papers in that we all used similar proxies and methods.  Common 
conclusion we all held is that regardless in U.S. market or Canadian market, it is the 
idiosyncratic risk that prevents investors from fully arbitraging the mispricing away, and 
this relationship held even under financial crisis.  
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